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KERANGKA PENGURANGAN AMARAN PALSU DAN 
PENILAIAN SKOR AMARAN UNTUK AMARAN 
PENCEROBOHAN 
 
ABSTRAK  
Pengesanan Enjin Amaran (Alert Detection Engine, ADE) merupakan sistem 
keselamatan rangkaian yang amat berkuasa. Ia digunakan untuk menjaga 
keselamatan rangkaian komputer. ADE mengesan pencerobohan keselamatan yang 
menyebabkan langkah keselamatan tidak dapat dilindungi. Walau bagaimanapun, 
ADE masih menghadapi masalah penjanaan amaran dengan jumlah amaran positif-
palsu yang banyak. Sering kali, ADE menjana amaran yang banyak dimana 
sebahagiannya adalah benar dan sebahagian lagi adalah palsu berlebihan. Justeru, hal 
ini menyebabkan bertambahnya kekeliruan bagi kalangan pembuat keputusan, untuk 
membuat penilaian amaran berkenaan. Secara khususnya, amaran benar daripada 
ADE tidak dikelaskan berasaskan magnitud yang dihadapi oleh mereka. Hal ini 
menyukarkan juruanalisis keselamatan untuk mengenal pasti serangan serta 
mengambil tindakan pemulihan terhadap ancaman. Oleh itu, magnitud bagi setiap 
ancaman perlu dikategorikan.  Pengkategorian darjah ancaman boleh dilakukan 
dengan menggunakan teknik perlombongan data, terutamanya apabila melibatkan 
data yang banyak. Terdapat pelbagai pendekatan pengurangan dan penilaian yang 
dicadangkan bagi menyelasaikan permasalahan ini.  
Tesis ini mengemukakan satu kerangka baru, Kerangka Pengurangan Amaran 
Palsu Dan Penilaian  Skor Amaran Untuk  Amaran Pencerobohan. Alasan bagi 
penggunaan kerangka adalah untuk mengurangkan amaran positif-palsu dan 
menilainya dalam usaha menentukan skor daripada ancaman amaran. Di samping itu, 
ia juga dapat memberikan pemahaman yang lengkap tentang serangan terhadap 
rangkaian serta memudahkan proses menganalisis mahupun menjimatkan masa 
xviii 
 
mereka. kerangka ini merupakan suatu sistem sendirian yang boleh berfungsi sebagai 
dalam-talian altaupun luar-talian. kerangka menggabungjalinkan tiga algoritma. 
Pertama, algoritma pengurangan baru (NAR) untuk mengeluarkan lebihan amaran 
daripada fail amaran serta mengurangkan positif-palsu. Kedua, algoritma Apriori 
multi sifat (MFA) dipertingkat, yang  mampu meningkatkan kerja dengan multisifat 
serta menjana set sifat berdasarkan korelasi pelbagai sifat amaran.  Penjanaan set 
sifat adalah sangat penting dan merupakan asas penilaian. Ketiga, algoritma IRG 
(improved rules generation), yang diubahsuai bagi membolehkan ia menjana aturan 
set sifat, mengira skor sifat ancaman, dan menilai seluruh ancaman dengan mengira 
skor ancaman bagi setiap amaran.  
Keputusan kerangka merangkumi dua fasa. Fasa pertama adalah modul 
pengurangan, yang mengurangkan jumlah amaran positif-palsu sebanyak 92.27% 
melalui penggunaan set data DARPA 1999 dan 93.39% melalui penggunaan set data 
NAv6 2012. Fasa kedua adalah modul penilaian iaitu yang mengakses amaran yang 
masih ada dalam modul pengurangan dan julat skor ancaman amaran adalah 2 – 8.89 
daripada 10. 
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A FALSE ALERT REDUCTION AND AN ALERT SCORE 
ASSESSMET FRAMEWORK FOR INTRUSION ALERTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Alert Detection Engine (ADE) is a powerful network security system that 
is used to secure computer networks. ADE can detect security breaches which other 
forms of security measures unable to uncover. Yet, it still suffers from the problem 
of generating huge amounts of alerts that are mostly false positives. Each ADE 
generates a large number of alerts, where some are real and the others are not (i.e. 
false or redundant alert). Consequently, this increases the ambiguity among the 
decision makers as they conduct assessments of alerts. In particular, real alerts of 
ADE are not classified based on the magnitude of the threat they pose. Therefore, it 
is difficult for the security analyst to identify attacks and take remedial action against 
their threats, making it necessary to categorize the magnitude of each threat. For this 
reason, it becomes necessary to categorize the degrees of threat using data mining 
techniques, especially where huge data are involved. Several reduction and 
assessment approaches have been proposed to solve these problems; however, they 
unable to address many other problems related to ADE. 
This thesis proposes a new framework called A False Alert Reduction and an 
Alert Score Assessment Framework for Intrusion Alerts. The objectives of using this 
framework are to reduce the false alerts and to assess such alerts and examine their 
threat scores. This work aims to provide a full understanding of the network attacks 
as well as ease the process for the analysts and save their time. Framework is a 
standalone system that can work online and offline. It combines the following 
algorithms: the first algorithm is New Alert Reduction (NAR) algorithm to remove 
the redundancy from the alert’s file and reduce the false positives. The second 
xx 
 
algorithm is called the improved Multi Feature Apriori (MFA) algorithm that has 
been enhanced to work with multi features and generate featuresets based on the 
correlation of various alert features (these generated featuresets are very important 
because they are basic requirements in any assessment), and the third algorithm is 
called the Improved Rules Generation (IRG) algorithm, which has been modified to 
enable it to generate rules for featuresets, compute the threat scores of the features, 
and assess the whole threat by calculating the threat score for each alert    
The results of framework have two phases. The first phase involves the 
reduction modules that reduce the amount of false positive alerts by 92.27% and 
93.39% using the DARPA 1999 and the NAv6 2012 data sets, respectively. The 
second phase involves the assessment modules that assess the remaining alerts from 
the reducing module, the rank threat score of alerts was ranged from 2 to 8.89 scores 
out of 10 scores.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Numerous techniques and approaches are used to address the threats 
faced by computer networks todays. The threats discussed within the context of 
this thesis are those caused by hackers and others trying to attack the network 
via denial of service methods and/or malware. The techniques used to address 
there threats can basically be divided into two categories; A proactive approach 
strategy to prevent any potential intrusion from befalling in the first place, and a 
reactive approach strategy to detect any break-in or intrusion that is in progress. 
 
The “Proactive Approach Strategy” involves setting up firewalls with 
strong filtering policies and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to prevent 
potential attacks. Patching security vulnerabilities in applications is also 
important within the “Proactive Approach Strategy” (Elshoush & Osman, 2011). 
 
The “Reactive Approach Startegy” involves hackers and intruders who 
will always try to circumvent the security perimeter set up. Through various 
methods such as zero-day attacks and social engineering, hackers can possibly 
infiltrate a network and its computers. Some of these reactive approaches 
involve Alert Detection Engines (ADE), (including Intrusion Detection System 
IDS, Firewalls, etc), malware data mining and real-time network monitoring. 
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1.2 Background  
Penetrations and threats are usually made by hackers to get into the 
desired networks or computer systems and to attack, hit or control the victim 
either by sending a virus, DDoS, worms, bot, and other forms of malware. 
(Elshoush & Osman, 2011; Tjhai, 2011).  
 
Most Alert Detection Engines, like an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) are an integral component of a network’s security architecture. They 
monitor incoming packets to try to identify their intrusive behaviors. An alarm is 
raised if a possible intrusive event is detected. This alarm gives the security 
analyst the opportunity to react promptly against the possible encountered threat. 
Most of the outputs of such engines contain a high proportion of unsuccessful 
alarms known as false positive alerts.  
 
Alert flooding occurs when signature-based Alert Detection Engines 
produce an alert for all potential malicious packets. While such a statement 
sounds logically reasonable, the amount of such potential alerts can be 
overwhelming. Accurate and efficient assessments are required to identify and 
reduce these false positive alerts. The following section introduces some 
background information about Alert Detection Engines. 
 
1.3 Alert Detection Engine (ADE) 
An Alert Detection Engine can assist in understanding external threats 
facing the network. Even though the Alert Detection Engine is unable to prevent 
threats, yet, it collects information when threats are encountered. This collected 
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information could then be used to correct mistakes and fill the gaps within the 
security architecture of the organisation (Maggi et al., 2009). 
 
Alert Detection Engines (like Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)) are 
available in the form of either software or hardware, where in both cases, they 
are used to monitor the network traffic. In network traffic, information within 
the network is not transmitted in-line into the alert detection engine device; 
rather, the alert detection engine monitors the traffic through an out-of-band 
network interface. When the Alert Detection Engine detects suspicious activity 
within the network, it sends an alert to the network administration regarding the 
potential threat, which could be an intrusion attempt (Elshoush & Osman, 2011).  
 
 
Figure1.1. Alert detection engine   
Preprocess 
 
Detection 
Process 
 
Alert Log 
File 
 
Capture 
and Copy 
Process 
Database 
R
u
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s
 
Network Link In Out 
Alert Detection Engine 
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A general diagram for the Alert Detection Engine is shown in Figure 1.1(Adnan, 
2009). It consists of three segments: 
 
1. Capture and Copy Process: this has the responsibility to capture and copy 
all incoming packets arriving from the network. 
 
2. Preprocess: it is responsible for preparing captured packets for the 
detection engine. This includes classification of the packets according to 
protocols 
 
3. Detection process: This process is responsible for checking the 
preprocessed packets for possible intrusions. 
 
Alerts are any sort of user notification of an intruder activity. When detection 
engines detect an intruder, they will inform the security administrator. The alert 
information consists of several lines, representing the features of the alert (El-Taj, 
2010). Most Alert Detection Engines logs contain certain common features. The 
details of these common features are as follows: 
 
 ID:  Unique identifier for the type of alert 
 Date: Date of the occurrence 
 Time: Time of the occurrence. 
 IP Source: IP address of the attacker 
 IP Destination: IP address of the victim. 
 Port Source: Port source on the attacker 
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 Port Destination: Port destination on the victim. 
 TTL: Time to live 
 IpLen: The size of IP header in bytes. 
 DgmLen: The size of packet in bytes. 
 Protocol: The protocol used 
 Priority: Priority of the alert. 
 TOS: Type of Service 
 CVE Ref.: Common vunerabilities and Exposures 
 
1.4 Problem Statement 
Despite the current capabilities of the Alert Detection Engine, it still suffers from 
the problem of generating a high level of false positive alerts. These can  sometimes be 
as high as 99% (Elshoush & Osman, 2011; Tjhai, 2008). As a matter of fact, this is an 
important factor that determines the performance of the Alert Detection Engines. These 
high levels of false positive alerts have received the attention of researchers and has 
prompted them to seek different techniques to resolve the problem by reducing the rate 
of such false positives alerts. Alerts can also be better evaluated if certain methods are 
used to classify these threats based on their magnitude of threat.  
 
The problem statement can summarized as follows: 
 
1. There is a need to reduce the voluminous false alerts generated by Alert Detection 
Engines, which  will increase the complexity and performance of the threat analysis 
system. 
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2. There is a need to assess each alert with a threat level. Even after reductions, some 
of the alerts may still be false or redundant alerts. Also, the alerts logged in the 
output of the Alert Detection Engines are not classified and are all trested as treats 
of equal magnitude. For the security analyst to better identify attacks and take 
appropriate remedial action against these threats, it would be useful to categorize 
the magnitude of each threat by attaching a threat level. 
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a framework which will consist 
of an enhanced false alert reduction system and an alert score assessment system. To 
achieve the above objective, the specific objectives are defined as follows: 
 
1. To propose a new false alert reduction algorithm which will reduce false alerts based 
specifically on the Time feature and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
(CVE) feature. 
 
2. To enhance two existing algorithms to support multiple features, which currently 
only support single feature, and add threat scores of features and alert to assess threat 
alert. 
 
3. To evaluate the performance of proposed systems against existing Alert Detection 
Engines techniques. 
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1.6 Thesis Contributions  
Alert Detection Engines analysts suffer from analyzing alerts because of the 
huge amount of redundant and false positive alerts. Their job is made even more 
difficult as there is no alert score assessment that would allow them to prioraties and 
assess threats based on threat level. This thesis provides solutions for these problems by 
providing the following: 
 
a) False Alert Reduction System: This system is based on a new proposed Reduction 
Alert (NAR) Algorithm containing three phases. The first phase removes any 
redundant alert, based on the similarities of alerts features. The second phase 
removes redundant alerts based on the similarities of the alerts features with time 
threshold values. The third phase of this algorithm removes identified confirmed 
false positive alerts based on existing rules. 
 
b) Alert Score Assessment System: This system contains of two sub-modules. The 
new proposed Generating Featuresets Sub-module is based on the Multi Feature 
Apriori (MFA) Algorithm. This algorithm is modified to analyse multiple features 
instead of its normal single feature analysis. The second sub-module is called the 
Generates Rules and Alert Score Sub-module. This sub-module is based on the 
Improve Rules Generation (IRG) Algorithm to generates rules and threat scores. This 
algorithm automatically calculates the threat scores of features and alerts.  
 
c) A False Alert Reduction and Alert Score Assessment Framework: In this 
framework, the above two systems are integrated to form a complete system which 
can work on online alerts or offline alerts using alert log files. This system aims to 
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make the Alert Detection Engines analyst’s task easier by reducing/removing some 
of the confirmed false positive alerts and also by providing them with new threat 
logs, in which, each threat has been assessed and marked with an appropriate threat 
level. 
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1.7 Research Methodology 
 Figure 1.2 illusetrate complete research methodology of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.2. Research methodology 
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1.8 Thesis Outline 
   This thesis is organized into six chapters. The current chapter (Chapter One) 
presents an introduction and a brief background of the proposed research work.  
 
Chapter Two  introduces the current and related background studies in the areas of 
reducing and assessing false positive alerts using Alert Detection Engines.  
 
Chapter Three presents the methodology of the proposed framework, and explains 
in detail the architectures of the framework. 
 
Chapter Four describes the and presents the implementation details of the entire 
framework. 
 
Chapter Five explains the experiments carried out to evaluate the proposed 
framework. It provides the evaluation results of each of the framework modules. It 
analyses and discusses the obtained results. It also includes comparisons against 
other related systems. 
 
Chapter Six provides the conclusion of the work covered within this thesis and 
proposes directions for future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter is divided into two main sections: Background and Related 
Work. The Background covers the Alert Detection Engines, Association rules for 
Data Mining, the Apriori algorithm and the Association rules generation algorithm 
are discussed.  
 
The Related work covers; the alert reduction approaches, the alert 
classification techniques, the alert correlation techniques, as well as the alerts 
assessment. The comparison between other related approaches with the proposed 
approach are explained in the table at the end of this chapter. 
 
2.2 Background 
In the following sections, background subjects are highlighted with the Alert 
Detection Engine (ADE) and Data mining algorithms that are used in the proposed 
system. 
  
2.2.1 Detection Engines 
In recent years, research into Detection Engines have attracted a lot of work. 
Detection Engines checks the data that passes through networks and reveals any 
suspicious data. (Bace & Mell, 2011; Lars, 2008; Szmit et al., 2012; Tjhai, 2011). 
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A False Positive Alertisan alert that is released by the Detection Engine but it 
is actually not a threat. The Detection Engine triggers a huge amount of alerts. The 
average rate of false positive alerts from these alerts was up about 99% (Elshoush & 
Osman, 2011). 
 
Security devices such as the firewalls, packet filtering, servers and IDS, work 
independently. They generate alerts which are written into a log file. The Detection 
Engine will then evaluate these log files and triggers alerts which will be sent to the 
analyst. The analyst will analyze these alerts to know the nature of the intrusion by 
using tools and techniques created for this purpose. This is to reduce the rate of the 
false positive alerts (Ignacio et al., 2008; Obbo, 2007; Tjaih, 2011). Nonetheless, 
there still exist weaknesses in processing such data due to the quantity of the data, 
even after the reduction process is done. A huge amount of false positive alerts still 
remain. 
 
2.2.2 Alert Detection Engine Classification 
  The following methods are used to categorize the Alert Detection Engine: 
 Information Source 
 Type Analysis 
 Response 
 Detection time 
 
  Figure 2.1 shows the Alert Detection Engine classification (Elshoush & 
Osman, 2011). These methods are the most common standards that were adopted to 
classify the Alert Detection Engine. 
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Figure 2.1. Classification of the alert detection engine 
 
 
2.2.2.1 Information Source 
The sources of the information may be classified into two ways.  
There are two types are (a) Network-Based Alert Detection Engine (NADE), and (b) 
Host-Based Alert Detection Engine (HADE). 
 
These are generally some of the most important factors which are based on 
designing an Alert Detection Engine and are classified according to the location. Some 
Alert Detection Engines examine the network packets detected on the network backbone 
or LAN, where as others events which are triggered by the application of a software or 
when the operating system shows signs of intrusion (Lars, 2008; Szmit et al., 2012). 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
(a) Network-Based Alert Detection Engine (NADE) 
 This type of detection engine principally functions to detect intruder threats. It 
aims to copy all the packets which pass throughout the network portion which is being 
analysed and triggers an alert when a potential threat is detected. (Szmit et al., 2012). 
 
 NADEs can also consists of a group of sensors, which are hidden at different 
positions of the network. (Hoang et al., 2009). This form of detection engine, has strong 
flexibility and the possibility to be located at any point of  the network. This is property 
which assists to increase security enhances the time to detect threats. (Pietro & Mancini, 
2008; Xu & Ning, 2008). Unfortunately, at the same time, it has some disadvantages 
represented by its inability to detect if an attack is successful or unsuccessful. This is 
because it has a general configuration and triggers a high number of false positives. 
 
(b) Host-Based Alert Detection Engine (HADE) 
 This type of detection engine works within a single host and is considered as the 
first point to detect intruders.  Its work depends on the data being transferred to or from 
a  computer. If the data originates from files in the operating system, it will analyze 
them and issue alerts when they are considered suspicious. 
 
 HADE has many advantages, some of which include the followings: it  analyzes 
the data before it is encrypted; a feature which is not available in the NADE. It also 
controls events locally, as such detects threats which escape the ADE. Unfortunately, it 
also gives a large number of false positive alerts, in addition to being costly and time-
consuming, since an HADE is required for each host. One important disadvantage of the 
HADE, however, is that it is easily disabled by the DDoS attacks (Xu & Ning, 2008).  
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2.2.2.2 Type Analysis 
 There are two methods of detecting and analyzing attacks : Anomaly-based 
Detection and Misuse-Based Detection. Anomaly-Based Detection is used in systems to 
detect suspicious activities and search for malicious patterns. Misuse-Based Detection is 
mainly used by commercial systems, and is based on suspicious behaviors (Wei-Zhou & 
Shun-Zheng, 2006). 
 
(a) Anomaly-Based Detection 
 The function of the anomaly detector depends on suspicious behaviors in the 
network or the host. Based on the type of data being used, attacks behave differently 
from one case to another. Building a data file from normal behaviors of users is called a 
profile. Furthermore, its construction is based on the collected data through normal 
processes during the movement of this data within the network. In particular, this type 
of detection examines the data being used in different standards to categorize which of 
the events are considered normal and suspicious (Elshoush & Osman, 2011). Such 
systems that depend on this method detect any anonymous attacks. Nonetheless, the 
anomaly detector has a low accuracy, which results in the generation of a large number 
of false positive alerts (Szmit et al., 2012). 
  
(b) Misuse-Based Detection 
           This method examines the system to search for activities which are identical 
to the signature or to a predetermined pattern describing an attack. A database is 
located within the system containing data about the patterns of the attacks. Therefore, 
the Misuse-based detector examines the network traffic depending on the 
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information from the database, compared to the patterns that are obtained from the 
network, where a match sends out an alert.  
 
Although these engines are effective in the detecting threats, they still generate 
some false positive alerts. Additionally, the engines are always required to update the 
databases with updated patterns of attacks, in order to obtain better results (Szmit et al., 
2012; Wei-Zhou & Shun-Zheng, 2006). These engines are, however, more popular 
because they provide accurate alerts and could easily be developed. 
 
One principal weakness of this method is its inability to identify non-predefined 
attacks which are not contained within the signature database. In any event, this 
knowledge is frequently and timely updated when there are new techniques of attacks or 
threats, even though it is difficult to fill all the knowledge bases (Jeremiah & Martin, 
2011). 
 
2.2.2.3 Response 
The reactions of the ADE  to analyze and detect an attack could always be 
grouped into Passive Response and Active Response categories. In general, the 
difference between the two classes is that the passive ADE sends reports to some other 
devices to take action, whereas the active ADE automatically begins reacting to such 
attacks (Morin et al., 2002). 
 
(a) Passive Response 
 Using Passive Response, the system user or security manager is notified to fix 
what has occurred. The system administrator is notified via an alert message regarding 
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the site and location of an attack. The system administrator then decides the next course 
of action to take, based on the information provided. 
 
(b) Active Response 
 This method will initiate an automatic action to be taken in response to certain 
types of intrusions. These responses can be categorized as follows: 
1) The ability to collect additional information: This involves increasing the sensitivity 
level of the sensor, in order to obtain additional clues of probable attacks. An example 
of this is the detection of all packages from the source at the beginning of the attack and 
during a specific period of time. 
 
2) The ability to change the environment: This is a type of response that could stop an 
attack as is the case with a TCP connection. In this response, a session is closed when 
TCP and RST segments are introduced to the invader and the victim or when the IP 
address of the invader or the assaulted port is fitted to the access router or to the 
firewall, to avoid future attacks (Khalid, 2008). 
 
2.2.2.4 Detection Time 
Two major  categories could be identified in the response detection time, which 
are; the “on-line” and “off-line” detections. When the intrusion detection process occurs 
in real time, it is categorized as on-line. When the process involves auditing data after it 
has been captures and stored, then it is termed as off-line.  
 
Engines which combine both types of detection times on-and off-line are referred to as 
hybrid Engines (Elshoush & Osman, 2011). 
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2.2.3 Snort 
Snort is an open-source ADE created by Roesch (Rafeeq, 2003). It is a very 
flexible and feasible software system that can be used with different types of 
databases, such as MySql,   Oracle, and so on. This software has an attack-detection 
engine and a port scanner. It also helps warn or respond to any type of previously 
identified attacks and works well under many types of OS, such as Ms Dos, 
windows, and linux. 
 
Snort provide two types of alerts: fast mode and full mode. The system 
presents options to the user to choose the required type of  alert. Figure 2.2 shows 
the fast mode alert, whereas Figure 2.3 shows the full mode alert. This thesis uses 
the full mode alert because it contains most of the features that can be found in other 
types of ADE as well.  
 
 
 Figure 2.2: Alert in fast mode  
 
Alert1: 
06/12-21:57:07.142376  [**] [1:408:5] ICMP Echo Reply [**] [Classification: Misc  
activity] [Priority: 3] {ICMP} 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.5 
 
Alert2: 
06/12-21:57:21.284093  [**] [1:19669:1] WEB-CLIENT Telnet protocol specifier in  
web page attempt [**] [Classification: Potential Corporate Privacy Violation]  
[Priority: 1] {TCP} 172.16.114.50:80 -> 196.227.33.189:8013 
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 Figure 2.3: Alert in full mode 
 
2.2.4 Alert log feature set 
 The alert log consists of a large volume of alerts that are issued from Alert 
Detection Engines. These alerts consists of a small section of real alerts and a large 
section of false alerts (Sundaram, 1996; Tadeusz, 2004).  
 
Each alert log consists generally of several lines. Each of these lines contain several 
features that represent specific information about the alert. Using this information it 
is possible to identify between real and false alerts. 
 
2.2.4.1 Common alert feature sets 
 Most Alert Detection Engines logs contain certain common features. When 
the alerts log comes from Alert Detection Engines, there is no standard on the format 
or what they should contain (Lars, 2008; Sundaram, 1996). However, all Alert 
Detection Engines logs contain certain standard common features including: 
Alert1: 
[**] [1:402:8] ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable [**] 
[Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]  
08/07-20:08:31.452777 135.8.60.182 -> 172.16.112.100 
ICMP TTL:63 TOS:0xC0 ID:1238 IpLen:20 DgmLen:106 
Type:3  Code:3  DESTINATION UNREACHABLE: PORT UNREACHABLE 
** ORIGINAL DATAGRAM DUMP: 
172.16.112.100:137 -> 135.8.60.182:137 
UDP TTL:127 TOS:0x0 ID:55809 IpLen:20 DgmLen:78 
Len: 50  Csum: 24455 (50 more bytes of original packet) 
** END OF DUMP 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2005-0068][Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2004-0790] 
Alert2: 
 [**] [1:19669:1] WEB-CLIENT Telnet protocol specifier in web page attempt [**] 
   [Classification: Potential Corporate Privacy Violation] [Priority: 1]  
   06/12-21:57:21.284093 172.16.114.50:80 -> 196.227.33.189:8013 
   TCP TTL:63 TOS:0x0 ID:5263 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1500 
   ***A**** Seq: 0x9D677108  Ack: 0xC4275704  Win: 0x7C00  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS11-064.mspx][Xref => 
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2011-1965] 
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 ID, presents the unique identifier for the type of alert. This feature consists of   
     three numbers. 
 The Generator ID number (GID) refers which component of ADE generated  
     The alert.  
 Signature ID (SID), is written directly into the rule by using the SID option   
     within ADE signatures.  
 Revision ID (RID) refers which revision of the signature was used. 
 
 IPSource refers to the IP address of the host sending the packet. This IP address 
consist from 4 parts spreated by dots. It ranges from 0-255, for example:  
172.16.112.207. 
 
 Port Source refers to what port on the source it was sent from. It can range from    
     0- 65535.  
 
 IP Destination refers to the IP address of the victim. Like IP Source, it consist   
    of 4 parts, exmaple: 202.126. 2.115. 
 
 Port Destination refers to destination port on the victim. It is be as number  
    such as 6667. 
 
 Priority (Severity) it is often based on which classification it comes from, but can 
be overridden for each signature. It is a preset value determined by the signature.  
   writer and is therefore a subjective value. it is devided to three level; High (1),  
    Medium(2), and Low(3). 
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 Date refers to the date of attack happened, for Example 03/09. 
 
 Time refers to time stamp of the time of occurrence. The Time feature consist 
from 4 parts (H:M:S.MS) the first represents the H for the hour, M for the minuts, 
S for the seconds, and MS for the micro seconds for example: 19:57:08.574994. 
 
 Protocol refers to the protocol used. It will in most cases be TCP, UDP, ICMP. 
 
 TTL refers to time to live from the IP header in the packet. For example 32. 
 
 IpLen refers to the size of IP header in bytes. For example 20 bytes. 
 
 DgmLen refers to the size of packet in bytes. For example 50 bytes. 
 
 CVE Ref. it is refers to the website reference of CVE value.This is described in 
detail in section 2.2.4.3. 
 
2.2.4.2 Time feature 
 The time feature is a very significant feature because it states the time that an 
attack happened. This info can be used to determine the specific time used by an 
attacker to conduct a particular attack. In this case, redundant of alerts can be 
identified by comparing the time between alerts from the same source. In order to 
reduce the false alerts, the time feature can be considered as a more reliable method 
because there are several sensors are included in the ADE. As such, it can be 
detected when acknowledgement is released for the same threat from several sensors 
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in extremely converged times (Elshoush & Osman, 2011). Using this information, 
the time feature with based on a threshold time value is used in this thesis.  
 
2.2.4.3 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Feature (CVE) 
CVE is the term used to refer to security threats and consists of two types, 
namely, vulnerabilities and exposures. Vulnerability refers to a computer, server, or 
network that is responsible for generating a definite and identifiable security risk in a 
particular context. Exposure refers to a security-related situation, event, or fact that 
might presented as a vulnerability to someone. 
 
The MITRE Corporation (Mitre, 2012) developed the CVE to facilitate data-
sharing process among diverse interests in security-related fields. CVE is a process 
of surfing for information using either security-related databases or the Internet. Such 
process is a collaboration of products from experts and representatives coming from 
different security-related organizations throughout the world.  
 
Once the items in the CVE are generated, the items are given names based on 
two criteria: (1) the year of the formal inclusion of each item; and (2) the order of 
each item in the list for the given year. To illustrate further, consider CVE-2008-
0080, which indicates a specific buffer overflow in the WebDAV Mini-Redirector in 
Microsoft Windows XP SP2, Server 2003 SP1 and SP2, and Vista. This condition 
may allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary codes via a crafted WebDAV 
response. The given item is thus added in 2008 and then given the sequence number 
80 for that year (Mitre, 2012; Techtarget, 2011). Figure 2.4 shows an example of 
CVE information details. 
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Figure 2.4. An example of CVE information details 
 
In each alert,  features that refer to the CVE reference are present and are 
relied upon in issuing the alert. When a return occurs to the CVE reference, the value 
of the score weakness or vulnerability is found. This value is then considered when 
calculating the threat score of the alert through its inclusion in the proposed research 
formula (Formula 4.1 in Chapter Four). The values of the CVE is contained within a 
system that is constantly updated and made available for all users. 
 
2.2.5 Association Rules 
Data mining is the process of extraction and analysis, by automatic or 
semiautomatic means, of large quantities of data in order to discover meaningful 
patterns and rules (Berry et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2010; Cios et al., 2010; Elis, 2001; 
Shilpa & Sunita, 2011). Data mining tools uncover hidden information. Relationship 
between variables and customer behavior that are non-intuitive are the gems that data 
Vulnerability Details : CVE-2011-0080 
Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the browser engine in Mozilla Firefox 3.5.x before 3.5.19 and 
3.6.x before 3.6.17, Thunderbird before 3.1.10, and SeaMonkey before 2.0.14 allow remote 
attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and application crash) or possibly 
execute arbitrary code via unknown vectors.   
Publish Date : 2011-05-07 Last Update Date : 2012-01-26 
Collapse All   Expand All   Select   Select&Copy   Scroll To  Comments  External Links  
- CVSS Scores & Vulnerability Types 
Cvss Score 10.0 
Confidentiality 
Impact 
Complete (There is total information disclosure, resulting in all system files being 
revealed.) 
Integrity 
Impact 
Complete (There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss 
of system protection, resulting in the entire system being compromised.) 
Availability 
Impact 
Complete (There is a total shutdown of the affected resource 
The attacker can render the resource completely unavailable.) 
Access 
Complexity 
Low (Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist.  
Very little knowledge or skill is required to exploit. ) 
Authentication Not required (Authentication is not required to exploit the vulnerability.) 
Gained Access None 
Vulnerability 
Type(s) 
Denial Of ServiceExecute CodeMemory corruption 
CWE ID CWE id is not defined for this vulnerability 
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mining hopes to figure out. There are different applications of data mining including 
in the business area, customer segmentation, market basket analysis, risk 
management, fraud detection, delinquency tracking, and demand prediction. The 
principal goals of data mining in practice can be classified into two categories, 
Description and Prediction (Cios et al., 2010; Kantardzic, 2011; Mamdouh, 2009; 
Tjha et al., 2008).  
 
Description is the process of trying to find relationships and patterns within the 
dataset .Patterns that are found are described in the form of rules based on statistical 
evidence.  
 
Prediction involves variables or fields within the database to predict unknown or 
future values of other variables of interest. In other words, prediction is the process 
of using the training data to predict the future value of a feature based on the values 
of other features. Prediction technique is common used in neural networks, 
classification, and decision trees to find the relations between the attribute values 
(Al-Shalabi, 2011; Goethals, 2003; Klaus & Marc, 2002).  
 
In general the data mining task involves; classification, clustering, similarity 
sequence discovery, sequential patterns, and association rules. This thesis focuses on 
association rules, because of the advantage of the benefits of association rules. This 
is important in finding a relationship between correlation confidence elements, 
through the generation of set of items that are on that basis the extraction roller and 
through which the degree of correlation confidence between the elements is 
calculated.  
